Job Market Paper
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Inventory shrinkage—merchandise missing from the store—accounts for about 1.6 percent of sales for United States retailers, on the order of grocers' net profit margin. Yet its drivers are not well understood. Partnering with a large Mexican retailer—more than 300 stores and roughly 25,000 workers at a time—I show that shrinkage varies with the store's organization: with the quality of its management and with its wage premium, and that the two work as complements. Leveraging manager rotations that are not directed by store performance, I estimate manager fixed effects on shrinkage. The managers who reduce it are not better bookkeepers; they monitor: they work more shifts, including nights and weekends, are more co-present with their workers on the floor, and rework the teams they inherit—moving workers up a tier and across areas, and raising turnover in the short run through quits, with no detectable rise in dismissals. On pay and schooling they are indistinguishable from the rest. Shrinkage also falls with the wage premium. But the two levers are not additive: after an arrival by one of these managers, shrinkage falls by 12 percent where the premium is high against 4 percent where it is low—a gap of 8 percentage points. An efficiency-wage model rationalizes the gap. Consistent with it, managers do not reorganize more where pay is high, but the same presence enforces more: suspensions rise only where there is a more valuable rent to confiscate.